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A LEGAL ROADMAP TO PRIVATIZING GOVERNMENT
SERVICES IN WASHINGTON STATE
Nancy Buonanno Grennan
Abstract: Government employers contract out and privatize some of their functions as one
way of meeting the public's need for more efficient and effective services. The Washington
State Supreme Court, in Washington Federation of State Employees v. Spokane Community
College, interpreted the state's civil service laws as imposing a nearly complete bar on
contracting out at the state level. That decision was later extended to local public sector
employers, who already face complex collective bargaining rules that require them to bargain
with unions about contracting out work that has been done or that could be done by their
unionized employees. This Comment analyzes both the judicial and statutory restrictions
imposed upon local public sector employers in Washington. It argues that the judicial
extension of the Spokane decision, a decision flawed in its own reasoning, to local public
sector employers was improper. It further argues for a less-restrictive interpretation and
application of current collective bargaining regulations.
In its decision in Washington Federation of State Employees v.
Spokane Community College' the Washington Supreme Court held that
the state's civil service laws restrict the state government's ability to
contract for services in the private sector. In reaching its conclusion that
procuring services ordinarily and regularly provided by classified civil
servants violates the basic policy and purpose of the Washington civil
service laws,2 the court carved out one narrow exception to this bar.
Specifically, a state agency may contract for services historically
performed by civil service workers only when it can show that these
workers are unable to provide the needed services.3
The bar to contracting out4 government services served as one of the
driving forces behind recent civil service reform legislation introduced in
1. 90 Wash. 2d 698, 702-03,585 P.2d 474,477 (1978).
2. Id. at 702, 585 P.2d at 477. The State Legislature codified this decision but limited it by
permitting contracting out of services if the services were regularly purchased by valid contract
before April 23, 1979, the effective date of the Act, and did not have the effect of terminating
existing civil service employees or positions. Act of April 23, 1979, ch. 46, §§ 1-2, 1979 Wash.
Laws 1141 (codified at Wash. Rev. Code §§ 41.06.380-.382 (1996)).
3. Spokane, 90 Wash. 2d at 702-03, 585 P.2d at 477.
4. Contracting out, as traditionally viewed, is "the replacement of employees in the existing
bargaining unit with those of an independent contractor to do the same work under similar
conditions of employment." Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 215 (1964).
Privatization, often used as a synonym for contracting out, is the transfer of responsibility for the
performance of desired functions to private institutions. Ronald A. Cass, Privatization: Politics, Law
& Theory, 71 Marq. L. Rev. 449, 450 (1988). Because Washington statutes and judicial decisions
treat these concepts synonymously, the terms also will be used interchangeably here. Outsourcing,
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the 1993 session and reintroduced in the 1995 session.5 The bill
contained a repeal of this restriction on state agencies;6 however, in these
two passage attempts, the bill failed to win the support of both houses of
the State Legislature.7 The attempts to eliminate the restriction caused
great furor among state employee unions who both feared losing
members' jobs and questioned contracting out's efficacy in general.'
Although the privatization battle at the state level has generated much
press,9 little attention has been paid to this issue as it relates to local
public sector agencies.'" A Washington appellate court extended the
Spokane holding to local public sector entities with civil service systems
similar to the state's." This judicially-imposed restriction adds another
layer of considerations for local agencies who already face complex local
public sector collective bargaining rules.' These rules require local
governmental employers to bargain with unions about contracting out
work that has been done or that could be done by their unionized
employees.'3
This Comment analyzes both the judicial and statutory restrictions
imposed upon Washington's local public sector employers. It argues that
another currently popular term often used synonymously with contracting out, generally refers to the
transfer of technological functions to an outside provider. See Mark L. Gordon & Timothy P. Walsh,
When Government Institutions Outsource Technology, Computer L., July 1996, at 15, 15.
5. Rebecca Boren, Lowry Joins a Hot Trend 'A Revolution' as States Contract Out Services,
Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Mar. 18, 1993, at Al; see Personnel System Reform Act of 1995, S. 5841,
54th Leg., Sess. 1 (Wash. 1995) (Second Substitute Senate Bill).
6. S. 5841 §§ 208, 403.
7. David Ammons, Lowry Wants Higher Minimum Wage, A.P. Pol. Serv., Dec. 20, 1995; S. 5841,
Legislative Digest & History of Bills of the Senate and House of Representatives, 54th Leg. Sess.
388-89 (Wash. 1996).
8. See, e.g., David Ammons, Labor Boils at Lowry Civil Service Plan, Morning News Trib.
(Tacoma, Wash.), Feb. 23, 1993, at B1; Patti Epler, The Roasting of Gov. 'Judas, State Workers see
Civil Service Bill as Betrayal, Morning News Trib. (Tacoma, Wash.), Mar. 20, 1993, at B1; Barbara
A. Serrano, Lowry Outrages Labor with Civil-Service Plan: Proposal to Streamline Services Would
Cut Some Job Protections, Seattle Times, Feb. 23, 1993, at C1.
9. See, e.g., Rebecca Boren, Lowry Presses Civil Service Reform but Opponents to Hold Rail),
Against Privatization Plan, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Mar. 17, 1993, at Al; Peter Callaghan,
Legislature '95: Lowry's Civil Service Reform Tastes Sweet, Sour to Political Palates, Morning
News Trib. (Tacoma, Wash.), Feb. 3, 1995, at B 1; Hal Spencer, Legislature '93: Business Puzzled as
Labor Decries Democrats' Support, Morning News Trib. (Tacoma, Wash.), Mar. 26, 1993, at B5.
10. Local public sector agencies are cities, counties, and other political subdivisions of the state.
Harry H. Wellington & Ralph K. Winter, Jr., The Unions and the Cities, Studies of Unionism in
Government 54 (1971).
11. Joint Crafts Council v. King County, 76 Wash. App. 18, 20-21,881 P.2d 1059, 1061 (1994).
12. Wash. Rev. Code ch. 41.56 (1996).
13. See infra part ll.B.
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the judicial extension of the flawed Spokane decision to local public
sector employers was improper. Furthermore, it argues that these
employers should be subject to a less-restrictive interpretation of current
collective bargaining regulations.
Part I traces the modem civil service system's development and public
sector collective bargaining's growth. It analyzes how both those systems
impact public employers' privatization decisions. Part II focuses on how
Washington's civil service system and collective bargaining regulations
restrict a local public sector employers' ability to contract for services
from the private sector. Part III describes how Washington public sector
employers can navigate through this complex set of rules and restrictions
to implement privatization decisions. Part IV criticizes Washington's
current laws regarding contracting out and provides suggestions for
change. Finally, part V recommends removing the current judicial
restrictions on contracting out and narrowing the collective bargaining
restrictions.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS REGULATING MODERN
PUBLIC EMPLOYERS
The modem civil service system and collective bargaining regulations
developed to address the needs of both the public and public employees.
Because the needs of these two groups often conflict, the schemes
present complex restrictions on government employers' privatization
attempts.
A. Development of the Civil Service System
The Pendleton Act of 1883'4 ushered in the era of the modem public
civil service system.I" Spurred when a disappointed office-seeker
assassinated President Garfield, 6 Congress enacted the legislation to
eliminate the political spoils system. 7 By establishing a hiring system
based on an applicant's merit, the Pendleton Act also sought to address
14. Pendleton Act of Jan. 16, 1883, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-1501 (1994); 40 U.S.C. § 42 (1994)).
15. Robert Vaughn, Principles of Civil Service Law § 1.2, at 1-3 (1976).
16. Ari Hoogenbloom, The Pendleton Act and the Civil Service, 64 Am. Hist. Rev. 301, 303
(1959).
17. 14 Cong. Rec. 206 (1882) (remarks of Senator Pendleton). But see Ronald N. Johnson & Gary
D. Libecap, Courts, A Protected Bureaucracy, & Reinventing Government, 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 791,
817-18 (1995), for a more cynical analysis of the passage of the Pendleton Act.
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the public's perception that the government was inefficient and its
workers incompetent."
Soon after the creation of the federal civil service system, state
legislatures followed suit, creating their own state systems with similar
intents to insulate state workers from the political process and to protect
the public from incompetent performers. 9 Modem civil service systems
also do much more: they provide job tenure, standardized salary
progression, and a whole host of other protections against arbitrary
personnel actions. 0
Although civil service systems have served vital functions, they are
increasingly the subject of criticism. One common criticism of civil
service systems is that they do their job too well: by protecting
employees from the political whims of newly-elected officials, these
systems also make it impossible for agencies to weed out incompetent
employees.2 ' Additionally, these same systems, though theoretically
based on merit principles, make it nearly impossible to reward merit.22
Such a lack of reward, coupled with a culture that discourages
innovation, erodes employee morale.' Another problem is an increasing
myriad of rules and regulations that have developed with the systems. 4
18. Vaughn, supra note 15, § 1.2, at 1-16 to 1-17. The system that evolved established a control-
based chain of command; the hierarchical system was viewed as the most efficient model for
governance. See Donald F. Kettl et al., Civil Service Reform: Building a Government that Works 11-
12 (1996). In addition, hiring practices were systematized and rules were promulgated concerning
promotions, the classification of duties, and the assignment of salary to those classifications.
Vaughn, supra note 15, § 1.3, at 1-27 to 1-28.
19. Vaughn, supra note 15, § 1.3, at 1-25. Although most states developed their own civil service
systems, extensive political patronage schemes survived in many jurisdictions until the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990). In Rutan, the
Court held that use of party affiliation to determine promotions, transfers, and recalls from layoff
impermissibly infringed upon the First Amendment rights of public employees. Id. at 75. It further
held that hiring decisions based on an applicant's political belief or support, in the absence of a vital
public interest, violated that applicant's First Amendment rights. Id. at 78-79. This decision
reaffirmed an earlier holding that the First Amendment proscribed patronage dismissals. Elrod v.
Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
20. See Kettl et al., supra note 18, at 16; Jonathan Walters, The Shrink-Proof Bureaucracy,
Governing, Mar. 1992, at 32, 36.
21. David Osborne & Ted A. Gaebler, Bringing Government Back to Life, Governing, Feb. 1992,
at 46, 49; Walters, supra note 20, at 36.
22. See David Osborne & Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit
is Transforming the Public Sector 158-59 (1993); see also Kettl et al., supra note 18, at 19 (noting
that for civil service employees "[t]here are few rewards for success beyond the intrinsic satisfaction
of ajob well done").
23. Kettl et al., supra note 18, at 19-20.
24. See Walters, supra note 20, at 36.
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Further, this complexity has caused the systems to become too
centralized and too rigid for local agencies to find effective solutions to
local problems, and too costly to maintain in an age of declining public
revenues.
25
B. Civil Service Restrictions on Contracting Out
Some governments have responded to these and other public concerns
by ceasing to provide directly some public services.26 Contracting out of
traditional governmental functions is not a new phenomenon," and it is
one that is ever increasing in popularity.2"
Contracting out certainly has its critics. Some critics argue that
contracting out is merely an anti-labor policy cloaked in the verbiage of
government efficiency. 29 These critics claim that the policy's true aim is
to vitiate the substantial force of public sector unionized labor.3" Other
critics assert that the short-lived economic benefits derived from
contracting out are vastly outweighed by the resulting long-term social
and economic detriments, including the rebirth of the political spoils
system in the award of government contracts.3
25. See Osborne & Gaebler, supra note 21, at 49-50. Because most civil service systems operate
with a centralized personnel system, through which all hiring, firing, and pay decisions are made,
agencies are left with little power to deal with their own, specific concerns. Jonathan Walters, The
Many Lives of Civil Service, How Not to Reform Civil Service, Governing, Nov. 1992, at 30,34.
26. See Kettl et al., supra note 18, at 48.
27. For example, when the federal government was eager for the mails to reach people living west
of the Mississippi River, it contracted with 80 riders collectively titled the Pony Express. Osborne &
Gaebler, supra note 22, at 335.
28. Kettl et al., supra note 18, at 48. The federal government alone spends $200 billion a year
contracting for goods and services. Id. at 49; see also Cass, supra note 4, at 450-52. For example,
California and New York have contracted with private companies to run various aspects of the
states' welfare systems. Juan Forero, A Private Face on a Public Program, Caseworkers Fear
Changes in Welfare Services, Star-Ledger (Newark, NJ.), Sept. 19, 1996, at 001. In addition, prisons
and county jails increasingly are being run by private companies. See Ken Neal, Who Gets the Keys?
Experienced Private Firns Need Consideration in Decision on Who Runs Tulsa County Jail, Tulsa
World, Aug. 25, 1996, at G1.
29. See, e.g., Craig Becker, With Whose Hands: Privatization, Public Employment, and
Democracy, 6 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 88, 88-89 (1988).
30. Id. The percentage of unionized government workers is relatively high at 37.8%. Labor
Statistics Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Pub. No. 41, Union Members in 1996 (1996). In comparison,
only 10.4% of nonagricultural private sector workers remain unionized.
31. See Boren, supra note 5, at Al; see also Cass, supra note 4, at 453-54. Because the
government is one of the largest employers of minorities and women, contracting out may have a
disparate impact on these groups. See Wellington & Winter, Jr., supra note 10, at 46; Women's
Employment in Federal, State, & Local Governments Increases, But Current Fiscal Crisis Threatens
Recent Gains, 29 Gov't Employee Rel. Rep. 851 (1991). The public also loses constitutional
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Proponents of contracting out counter that privatization can produce
both short- and long-term savings to taxpayers. Furthermore,
proponents argue, agencies can ensure that a contract award is not a
surreptitious reward for political support by creating a bidding system
that is open, competitive, and publicly announced.3
Several state courts, including Washington's, have entered the fray.
Some courts have held that contracting out violates the state's civil
service laws. 34 Some have based such a decision on the absence of
explicit legislative or agency controls to protect current employees'
rights and to prevent political patronage in the award of public
contracts.35 Washington courts have imposed an almost complete bar on
contracting out.36 Other state courts have recognized the public policy
implications of contracting out, but refuse to hold that the mere existence
of a civil service system mandates such pervasive restrictions on
privatization."
protections when governments employ private contractors. See Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13
(1948).
32. See, e.g., President's Comm'n on Privatization, Privatization: Toward More Effective
Government 1-2 (1988); see also Kettl et al., supra note 18, at 67-68 (discussing increased savings
and productivity that can result when government workers are required to compete with private
contractors for projects).
33. See Timothy P. Dowling, Note, State Civil Service Law-Civil Ser.ice Restrictions on
Contracting Out by State Agencies-Washington Federation of State Employees v. Spokane
Community College, 55 Wash. L. Rev. 419,424 (1980). The U.S. Supreme Court's recent decisions
extending First Amendment rights to private contractors, protecting them against retaliation for the
exercise of rights of political association or the expression of political allegiance, addresses some of
the concerns that contracting out will facilitate a return to the spoils systems. O'Hare Truck Serv.,
Inc. v. City of Northlake, 116 S. Ct. 2353, 2355 (1996); Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 116
S. Ct. 2342,2346 (1996).
34. See, e.g., Colorado Association of Public Employees v. Department of Highways, 809 P.2d
988, 995 (Colo. 1991); Washington Federation of State Employees v. Spokane Community College,
90 Wash. 2d 698, 699,585 P.2d 474,476 (1978).
35. Horrell v. Department of Admin., 861 P.2d 1194, 1200 (Colo. 1993).
36. Spokane, 90 Wash. 2d at 699, 585 P.2d at 476. See infra part II.A for iirther discussion of
Washington's approach.
37. See, e.g., Ball v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges, 248 A.2d 650, 654 (Md. 1968) (holding
that department heads may abolish merit system positions and lay off merit system employees,
provided such action is done in good faith and is not subterfuge to evade merit system laws);
University ofNev. v. State Employees Association, Inc., 520 P.2d 602, 606-07 (Nev. 1974) (holding
that appointing authority may only contract out when acting in good faith, effe:ting "a real and not
fundamentally sham reorganization... for substantial rather than arbitrary and capricious reasons");
Corwin v. Farrell, 100 N.E.2d 135, 139 (N.Y. 1951) (holding that contracting out is permissible as
long as private contractor is controlled by private entity and no evidence exists of subterfuge
employer-employee relationship between contractor and public entity); State ex rel. Sigall v. Aetna
Cleaning Contractors, Inc., 345 N.E.2d 61, 65 (Ohio 1976) (per curiam) (holding that contracting out
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Some state courts have refused to limit the government's ability to
privatize.3 These courts have noted that the government's pursuit of a
long-term substantial economic savings through privatization does not
violate the civil service act's intent or purposes.39 These courts found
nothing inherent in their civil service systems requiring that everyone
who provides a service for the state must occupy a civil service position,
even if civil service employees once provided that service.4"
Whatever one's position on contracting out, the subject is clearly
controversial. As governments struggle to address public perceptions of a
vast bureaucracy, Kafkaesque in its rules and regulations, privatizing
services will continue to be one of the main avenues of reform.
C. Public Sector Collective Bargaining
Public sector employees' collective bargaining rights are layered on
top of this complex web of personnel rules and regulations and their
concomitant restrictions on contracting out government services. 4'
Statutes granting public employees collective bargaining rights
developed much later than civil service legislation, generally because of
the wide-spread perception that the collective bargaining process was
inimical to public employment.42 This perception stemmed in part from a
is permissible in absence of proof of employer bad faith or intent to thwart purposes of civil service
system).
38. See, e.g., Moore v. Alaska, 875 P.2d 765, 771 (Alaska 1994); Connecticut State Employees
Association v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Conn., 345 A.2d 36, 40 (Conn. 1974); Michigan State
Employees Association v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 367 N.W.2d 850, 852 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985); In re
Local 195, International Federation of Professional and Technical Employees, 443 A.2d 187, 193
(NJ. 1982); Kiger v. Nixon, No. 90-3354-1, 1996 WL 512031, at *7 (Tenn. App. Sept. 11, 1996).
39. See, e.g., Michigan State Employees Association, 367 N.W.2d at 852; Stump v. Department of
Labor & Indus., 624 A.2d 229 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993). Other courts have found that the need for
specialized equipment or expertise may justify contracting out decisions. See, e.g., Professional
Engineers in California Government. v. Department of Transp., 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 599, 603-04 (Ct.
App. 1993) (upholding scheme to enlist private finance, design, construction, and operation of
transportation facilities to solve state transportation needs that could not be met with available public
revenue; noting private contractors were to construct portions of highways in exchange for operation
and collection of tolls); Professional Engineers in California Government v. Department of Transp.,
51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 465, 484 (Ct. App. 1996), (upholding statute authorizing contracting for seismic
retrofitting of bridges), review granted, 917 P.2d 1165 (Cal. 1996).
40. Michigan State Employees Ass'n, 367 N.W.2d at 852. The Texas Supreme Court took a
similar position in rejecting a public employee's challenge to contracting out custodial services.
Moncriefv. Tate, 593 S.W.2d 312, 313-14 (Tex. 1980).
41. See Donald H. Wollett et al., Collective Bargaining in Public Employment 189-90 (4th ed.
1993), for examples of federal and state collective bargaining laws.
42. Id. at4-6.
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belief that public employee unions would have too great an influence on
the legislative budgeting and policy agenda.43 Not until President
Kennedy granted bargaining rights to unions representing federal
employees in 1962, did the concept of public sector bargaining become
acceptable.' Following the lead of the federal government, many states
also guaranteed their employees bargaining rights, and the ranks of
organized public employees swelled.45
Although it is recognized that most public employees have a
constitutionally protected right to join a union,46 there is no constitutional
compulsion for public employers to recognize and bargain with these
unions.47 Dependent, therefore, on the legislature's or executive's grant
of bargaining authority, state governments differ considerably as to the
topics they have allowed to be placed on the bargaining table.48 For
example, some states, like Washington, do not permit state employees to
bargain over wages, leaving that decision to the Legislature.49 A few
states have granted their employees bargaining rights modeled after those
contained in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)."0 In these latter
instances, negotiations cover the myriad of topics encompassed by the
43. Wellington & Winter, Jr., supra note 10, at 25; see also Clyde Summers, Bargaining in the
Government's Business: Principles and Politics, 18 U. Tol. L. Rev. 265,267-63 (1987).
44. Exec. Order No. 10,988, 27 Fed. Reg. 551 (1962); see also Lawrence Green & Claire Hotto,
Comment, Public Employees'Bargaining Rights in Washington, 14 Gonz. L. Rev. 197, 197 (1978).
In contrast, Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994)), almost 30 years prior to the public sector
equivalent.
45. Wollett et al., supra note 41, at 9; see also John F. Burton, Jr. & Terry Thomason, The Extent
of Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector, in Public Sector Bargaining 15-17 (2d ed. 1988)
(discussing factors leading to accelerated growth of public sector unionization).
46. Although courts have generally recognized that union membership is protected by the right of
association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, a public employer may restrict a public
employee's right of association ifjustified by an overwhelming public interest, specifically related to
the association at issue. Vaughn, supra note 15, § 9.2, at 9-7; see also Well ngton & Winter, Jr.,
supra note 10, at 74-75.
47. Green & Hotto, supra note 44, at 197. The scope of bargaining rights is a product of
legislative action or executive order. Id.
48. Vaughn, supra note 15, § 9.3, at 9-24 to 9-26 (1976). Some states have allowed bargaining
over only subjects not addressed by the civil service system, others have exempted only certain
subjects. Id. at 9-31 to 9-32.
49. See infra part I.B for a discussion of Washington's approach. See also June Miller
Weisberger, The Appropriate Scope ofBargaining in the Public Sector: The Continuing Controversy
and the Wisconsin Experience, 1977 Wis. L. Rev. 685, 699-700. Several courts have held that public
employers do not have the authority to engage in collective bargaining. Id. at 695 n.29. These courts
reason that because the budget-making functions of governmental bodies are nondelegable, the
public employer must retain the ultimate authority to set wages and benefits. Id. at 695.
50. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994); see Wellington & Winter, Jr., supra note 10, at 146-47.
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phrase "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment." 5'
More typically, state legislatures have rejected the private sector scope
language or have combined it with new language to form a hybrid of
sorts. 2 Even though many state legislatures initially distanced their
bargaining laws from the private sector model, many courts and state
administrative agencies, vested with the responsibility of enforcing the
states' labor laws, have, however, turned to the precedent developed
under the NLRA for guidance in deciding scope-of-bargaining
questions.5 3
D. Collective Bargaining Restrictions on Contracting Out
Some states have looked to National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)54
and federal court decisions to guide them in determining whether a
governmental entity's contracting out decision is a mandatory bargaining
subject.55 The seminal private sector contracting out case is Fibreboard
Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB.56 The U.S. Supreme Court held that, on
the facts of that case, subcontracting was a mandatory subject of
bargaining." Fibreboard contracted out its maintenance work to cut labor
costs but failed to bargain that decision with the union representing its
regular maintenance staff.58 Further, the company replaced its own laid
off employees with those of the subcontractor, working in the same
building, and performing the same duties as Fibreboard's regular
51. Wellington & Winter, Jr., supra note 10, at 147. In NLRB v. Wooster Div. of the Borg-
Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958), the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the NLRB's approach of
dividing proposals into three categories of bargaining subjects: mandatory, permissive, and illegal.
See id. at 349.
52. Weisberger, supra note 49, at 700. Some states limited the discussions of topics to just that:
discussions; in lieu of bargaining rights, unions have the right to request to meet and confer over
issues but the employer retains the authority to set unilaterally wages and all other terms and
conditions of employment. See Wellington & Winter, Jr., supra note 10, at 146.
53. Weisberger, supra note 49, at 706; see also Saratoga Springs City Sch. Dist. v. New York
State Pub. Employment Relations Bd., 68 A.D.2d 202, 207-08 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (determining
that consideration of private sector decisions as useful guide was not precluded, though statute
explicitly proscribed use of those decisions as binding precedent).
54. The NLRB is the administrative agency created to administer federal labor policies in the
private sector. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169.
55. See, e.g., Local 316, Service Employees International Union v. State Educ. Labor Relations
Bd., 505 N.E.2d 418,423 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Salem Police Employees Union v. City of Salem, 781
P.2d 335, 340 (Or. 1989).
56. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
57. Id at213-14.
58. Id. at 207.
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employees. The only difference was that the employer no longer had to
pay the wages, premiums, or other benefits it had previously bargained
with the union. 9 Justice Stewart concurred separately to emphasize that
the Court's holding did not mandate bargaining over every contracting
out decision, but merely on the facts of the case before them such
bargaining was required.
60
Following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Fibreboard, the
NLRB and circuit courts of appeals generally have required an employer
to bargain over decisions to contract out what had been bargaining unit
work when done to reduce labor costs.6' Bargaining in those instances is
particularly appropriate, reasoned the NLRB, because the "desire to
reduce costs involves factors that are within the Union's control."'62
Though the NLRB has adopted a per se rule requiring bargaining if
essentially Fibreboard-type contracting out is involved,63 it has
acknowledged that there are cases in which the employer's contracting
out decisions are outside the range of bargaining or are dictated by
emergencies, rendering bargaining impracticable.'
In applying this standard to the public sector, the state courts are split
as to whether, on the facts of any given case, bargaining over contracting
out is mandatory. Some state courts and administrative agencies have
applied the more rigid private sector precedent to find that privatizing
unionized work is a mandatory subject of bargaining, given that such a
decision always implicates employment terms and conditions.65 Other
59. Id. at213.
60. Id. at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring).
61. See, e.g., Olivetti Office U.S.A. Inc. v. NLRB, 926 F.2d 181, 186 (2d Cir. 1991); NLRB v.
Plymouth Stamping Div., Eltec Corp., 870 F.2d 1112, 1116 (6th Cir. 1989); W.W. Grainger, Inc. v.
NLRB, 860 F.2d 244, 248 (7th Cir. 1988).
62. Rock-Tenn Co., 319 N.L.R.B. 1139, 1139 (1995).
63. Mid-State Ready Mix, Div. of Torrington Indus., Inc., 307 NLRB 809, 810 (1992).
64. Id.; see also Furniture Rentors of Am., Inc. v. NLRB, 36 F.3d 1240, 1248-49 (3d. Cir. 1994).
In finding that the NLRB's per se rule for Fibreboard situations contravened the U.S. Supreme
Court's precedent in this area, the Third Circuit noted that the mere decision to contract out is not
what triggers the bargaining obligation but rather, whether "'requiring bargaining over this sort of
decision will advance the neutral purposes of the Act.' Id. at 1248 (quoting First Nat'l Maintenance
Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681 (1991)). In its First National Maintenance Corp. decision, the
U.S. Supreme Court concluded that in recognizing an employer's need for unencumbered decision-
making, "bargaining over management decisions that have a substantial impact on the continued
availability of employment should be required only if the benefit for labor-management relations and
the collective bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the business." 452
U.S. at 679 (emphasis added).
65. See, e.g., Local 316, Service Employees International Union v. State Educ. Labor Relations
Bd., 505 N.E.2d 418, 423 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (noting that employers and representatives of their
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state courts have rejected that approach, holding that such decisions,
when made for policy reasons, are public policy matters that are
inappropriate for resolving through the collective bargaining process.6
In short, the rather simplistic aims of the Pendleton Act of 1833 and
the collective bargaining laws have evolved into a complex web of rules
and regulations covering nearly every public sector entity in the nation.
Navigating through this multilayered system is no sure and easy task for
an agency that chooses to get out of the business of providing directly
some portion of its services.
II. WASHINGTON STATE'S RESTRICTIONS ON
CONTRACTING OUT GOVERNMENT SERVICES
Like most of its fellow state governments, Washington's civil service
system has been criticized for its unwieldy constraints on government
action. Unlike many of its counterparts, however, Washington's courts
and Legislature have added to these constraints, by imposing restrictions
on local governmental entities' privatization attempts.67 These restraints
emanate from judicial interpretations of the state's civil service system
and from application of collective bargaining regulations.
A. The Civil Service System as a Bar to Contracting Out
A 1961 initiative created Washington State's civil service system.68
The initiative established a personnel system "based on merit principles
employees are required to bargain collectively about contracting out work previously performed by
members of existing bargaining unit); Saratoga Springs City Sch. Dist. v. New York State Pub.
Employment Bd., 68 A.D.2d 202, 207 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (finding state public employment
board's decision mandating bargaining over subcontracting not arbitrary and capricious).
66. See, e.g., In re Local 195, International Federation of Professional and Technical Employees,
443 A.2d 187, 194-95 (N.J. 1982) (holding that substantive decision to subcontract is nonnegotiable
matter of managerial prerogative but when decision to contract out is purely fiscally-driven, public
employer may discuss decision with union, as employees would have suggestions for improving
economy or efficiency); Unified Sch. Dist. No. I v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 259
N.W.2d 724, 731-32 (Wis. 1977) (holding that applicable standard is whether particular decision is
primarily related to wages, hours, and conditions of employment of employees or whether it is
primarily related to formulation or management of public policy. If latter issue predominates
decision, matter is properly reserved to decision by elected officials); see also Bay City Education
Association v. Bay City Pub. Schs., 422 N.W.2d 504 (Mich. 1988).
67. See infra parts ll.A-.B for a discussion of these restrictions.
68. Initiative Measure No. 207, ch. 1, 1961 Wash. Laws 7 (codified at Wash. Rev. Code ch. 41.06
(1994)). In response to perceived abuses of the current administration, the League of Women Voters
teamed up with the Washington Federation of State Employees, the union representing a large
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and scientific methods."69 A separate but nearly identical system was
created for higher education institutions.70 Administrative agencies, to
which the responsibility of maintaining the system was delegated, 7' have
developed rules covering every conceivable facet of employment. These
rules cover topics ranging from hiring72 and firing73 to the type of leave
an employee may take in times of inclement weather.74 In all, there are
over four hundred separate provisions, 7s excluding rules regulating the
employment of higher education institution employees. 76 Many local
public sector agencies in Washington followed suit and adopted similar
kinds of civil service systems applicable to their own employees.77
Washington's civil service system has been the target of waste and
inefficiency allegations.78 Washington public employers are limited,
however, in how they can address such concerns. The first Washington
case restricting a state agency from contracting out was Washington
Federation of State Employees v. Spokane Community College.79 In that
case, Spokane Community College contracted with a private company in
1976 to provide janitorial services in a new office building rather than
hire more custodians to do the work." The college anticipated an annual
savings of more than $10,000 and intended to use the money saved to
fund more student instruction.8' None of the employees were to lose their
percentage of state employees, to sponsor the state-wide initiative. Telephone Interview with Bill
Daley, Senior Executive Policy Assistant to Governor Lowry (Mar. 18, 1996).
69. Wash. Rev. Code § 41.06.010 (1996).
70. Wash. Rev. Code ch. 28B.16 (1992).
71. Wash. Rev. Code § 41.06.150 (1996). Effective July 1, 1993, a Washington personnel
resources board was created, replacing the state personnel board and the higher education personnel
board. Ch. 281, § 1, 1993 Wash. Laws 1060.
72. Appointments-Separations, Wash. Admin. Code ch. 356-30 (1995 & Supp. 1996).
73. Disciplinary Actions-Appeals, Wash. Admin. Code ch. 356-34 (1995 & Supp. 1996).
74. Wash. Admin. Code § 356-18-115 (1995).
75. Department of Personnel, Wash. Admin. Code tit. 356 (1995 & Supp. 1996).
76. See Higher Education Personnel Board, Wash. Admin. Code tit. 251 (1995). The higher
education system has over 350 rules governing employment. Id.
77. See, e.g., King County Charter art. 5, § 510 (1993); Seattle City Charter art. XVI, § 4 (1992).
Home rule charter counties and first class cities have as broad a legislative authority as the state
except when expressly restricted by constitutional provisions or enactments of the State Legislature.
King County Council v. Public Disclosure Comm'n, 93 Wash. 2d 559, 611 P.2d 1227 (1980). As no
explicit restriction was enacted by the State Legislature, charter counties arid cities retained the
authority to establish their own unique personnel system.
78. See Boren, supra note 9, at Al.
79. 90 Wash. 2d 698, 585 P.2d 474 (1978).
80. Id. at 699, 585 P.2d at 476.
81. Id. at 699-700, 585 P.2d at 476.
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jobs, or experience any decrease in pay or work premiums due to
contracting out.
82
The Washington Federation of State Employees, the union
representing civil service employees who regularly provided janitorial
services to that college, filed suit, alleging that the college lacked
authority to contract for services traditionally performed by civil service
employees.8 3 The Washington Supreme Court agreed, and held that the
state's civil service law barred contracting out new services that civil
service employees have regularly and historically performed.84 Because
merit is the overriding principle in employee selection and retention, the
court reasoned that procuring services ordinarily provided by these
classified employees through independent contracts violates the civil
service law's essential purpose."
The court went on to clarify that real or anticipated cost savings could
not be a basis for eschewing the civil service system in favor of outside
contractors.86 It reasoned that the state's interests, as embodied in its
legislation, are best served by a merit-based personnel system, regardless
of "mere costs."87 The court determined that contracting out is
permissible only when the governmental entity can prove that a new
need for services has arisen that is beyond the agency's capacity to
fulfill.88
A subsequent court of appeals decision narrowed Spokane's rule by
holding that a state agency is not bound by the contracting out strictures
when it is no longer feasible to continue to provide services, and the
agency "abolish[es] completely one aspect of its operation."89 In Keeton
v. Department of Social Services,9" the court held that the Department of
Social Services did not violate the state's civil service laws by laying off
its bakers and buying baked goods at the local market.9 The court
82. Id. at 701,585 P.2d at 477.
83. Id. at 699, 585 P.2d at 476.
84. Id. at 702-03, 585 P.2d at 477. The law in question in the case was the state's Higher
Education Personnel Law, Wash. Rev. Code ch. 28B.16.
85. Spokane, 90 Wash. 2d at 702, 585 P.2d at 477.
86. Id. at 703, 585 P.2d at 477-78.
87. Id.
88. Id. A later case held that even a state agency's contract with a local city for police services
violated the state civil service laws. Western Wash. Univ. v. Washington Federation of State
Employees, 58 Wash. App. 433,442, 793 P.2d 989,994 (1990).
89. Keeton v. Department ofSoc. Servs., 34 Wash. App. 353, 359, 661 P.2d 982, 986 (1983).
90. Id.
91. Id.
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distinguished Spokane by noting that the department abolished
completely its bakery operation, and purchased goods, not services, from
the private sector.
92
In 1994, the Spokane analysis was extended to local public sector
agencies. In Joint Crafts Council v. King Couno 3, the court found that
the King County Department of Public Safety's decision to use private
sector service stations to provide on-going maintenance to police cars did
not violate the county's civil service rules.94 The county had
implemented a new police car assignment policy that allowed police
officers to take home their individual cars.95 Under this new "car-per-
officer" program, police officers could service their cars at private
maintenance shops near their homes rather than at the centralized facility,
which was staffed by civil service employees.96
In extending the Spokane rationale to local public sector entities, the
court both heightened the restrictions on local-level contracting out and
broadened the exceptions to the rule. It held that, although civil service
principles require county civil service employees to provide those
services that they have customarily provided, contracting out is
permissible when the government agency can show "that it is not
practicable for civil servants to provide the necessary services."97 The
court found the county's rationale for contracting out services analogous
92. Id.
93. 76 Wash. App. 18, 21, 881 P.2d 1059, 1061 (1994). Here the court applied the Spokane rule
without comparing fully the county's own civil service system with that of the state. Id. at 20, 881
P.2d at 1061. The two systems varied greatly in that the county charter under consideration in Joint
Crafts enabled county managers to lay off its employees for reasons of "efficiency." King County
Code § 3.12.300 (1993). This efficiency rationale was not available to state managers at the time of
the Spokane decision and is one of the implicit rationales behind the judicial limitation imposed on
the state. See infra part IV.D for further discussion of this issue.
94. Joint Crafts, 76 Wash. App. at 21, 881 P.2d at 1061. The majority of King County employees
are covered under a civil service system. See King County Charter art. 5, § 550 (1993). The King
County Charter provides for "an effective personnel system for the county which will assure:
recruitment, selection and retention of county employees on the basis of merit; the development of a
county career service; promotion on the basis of demonstrated ability; and compensation and
personnel practices which will keep the county system competitive." King County Charter art. 5,
§ 510 (1993).
95. Joint Crafty, 76 Wash. App. at 19, 881 P.2d at 1060.
96. Id., 881 P.2d at 1060-61. The change in the car policy resulted in a decrease in officers'
average response times to both a report of a crime and an emergency call, despite the dramatic
increase in the county's population and crime rate. Appellant's Brief at 5-6, Joint Crafts (Nos.
32599-0-4, 32990-1-1).
97. Joint Crafts, 76 Wash. App. at 21,881 P.2d at 1061.
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to the situation in Keeton.9" It therefore upheld contracting out vehicle
maintenance services on the finding that it was no longer practicable for
civil service employees to continue to provide these services. 99
B. Local Public Sector Collective Bargaining Restrictions
Before a local public sector employer in Washington may privatize
existing or planned services, it not only must meet the judicially-imposed
requirements outlined above, it also must comply with collective
bargaining laws and regulations. The collective bargaining rights of
public employees of cities, counties, and political subdivisions of the
state are provided by the Public Employees Collective Bargaining Act
(PECBA)." ° The Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) is
the state administrative agency empowered to administer and enforce the
provisions of the PECBA. 0' The PECBA requires local public employers
to engage in collective bargaining over wages, hours, and working
conditions with their employees' exclusive bargaining representatives. 2
PERC has deemed these topics mandatory bargaining subjects. 03
PERC has found that employers must bargain the decision to assign
work that bargaining unit employees historically have performed or
98. Id. at 22-23, 881 P.2d at 1062. Unlike the state agency's actions in Keeton, however, the
County continued to maintain the centralized maintenance shop, and did not lay off any of its
maintenance employees. Id. at 19-20, 881 P.2d at 1061. Thus, though the County was privatizing
some services, it did not abolish completely one aspect of its operation. See Keeton v. Department of
Soc. Servs., 34 Wash. App. 353, 359, 661 P.2d 982,986 (1983).
99. Joint Crafts, 76 Wash. App. at 22-23, 881 P.2d at 1062.
100. The Public Employees Collective Bargaining Act, ch. 108, 1967 Wash. Laws 1884, (codified
at Wash Rev. Code ch. 41.56 (1996)). The Act exempts employees of public utility districts, school
districts, port authorities, and the state ferry system. Wash. Rev. Code § 41.56.020.
101. Wash. Rev. Code oh. 41.58 (1996).
102. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 41.56.030(4), .140(4). The Washington Legislature has required local
public sector employers to engage in full scope collective bargaining, which it has largely refused for
its own employees. Currently state employee bargaining is limited to grievance procedures and
personnel matters over which the agency or institution may lawfully exercise discretion. Wash. Rev.
Code § 41.06.150(13) (1996). Because the civil service rules are so pervasive and are subjects over
which the agencies cannot exercise discretion, the scope of bargaining is sharply constricted. See
Senate Bill Report, S. 5841, at 2 (Wash. 1996).
103. Port of Seattle, PECB No. 4989, at 14 (1995). An employer is prohibited from making
unilateral changes to previously established wages, hours, and working conditions, "unless it has
given notice of the proposed change to the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees, and
has provided the union with an opportunity to bargain regarding the proposed change." North
Franklin Sch. Dist., PECB No. 3980, at 9 (1992). A refusal to bargain over a mandatory subject
constitutes an unfair labor practice. Wash. Rev. Code § 41.56.140(4).
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could have performed"° to persons outside of the bargaining unit.ls
Where a collective bargaining agreement contains an expansive
management rights' clause or contractual waiver, PERC interprets these
waivers very strictly, looking for adequate indicia that the union
knowingly signed away its bargaining right on a particular subject. 1 6 In
contrast to the precedent of many states,"0 7 PERC has acknowledged only
a narrow set of circumstances when a contracting out decision falls
outside the mandatory bargaining realm.0 8 Further, PERC has rejected
explicitly some justifications recognized under federal case law for
excluding the decision from bargaining.0 9
The Washington Supreme Court has held that to determine what is a
mandatory subject of bargaining, PERC must do a case-by-case analysis
of the proposal in question."' According to the court, PERC must
balance the proposed course of action's impact on wages, hours, and
working conditions against the employer's need for entrepreneurial
control.' The court stressed that each case will have unique
circumstances in which the needs of either labor or management will
vary; each case therefore demands independent evaluation." 2 Although
104. See Community Transit, PECB No. 3069, at 11 (1988) (requiring bargaining over work that
could be performed by unit employees); City of Kelso, PECB No. 2120-A, at 6 (1985) (requiring
bargaining over work historically performed by bargaining unit employees). It is unclear how far
PERC will push the "could have been performed" prong. In Community Transit, PERC held that the
employer was required to bargain the decision to expand its contract with a private bus company to
provide commuter services when its own employees, bus drivers, had provided similar services in
the past. Community Transit, PECB No. 3069, at 11.
105. PERC has held that this duty arises whether the employer transfers work to its own
employees outside of the bargaining unit, an act known as "skimming," City of Seattle, PECB Nos.
4163, 4164, at 24 (1992), or to another entity altogether, either private or public. City of Kelso,
PECB No. 2120-A, at 6-7 (work in question went to neighboring fire district).
106. City of Kelso, PECB No. 2633, at 25 (1988) (requiring that "waivers must normally be
'express' ... and must be clear and unmistakable") (citations omitted). waivers also may be found
when the employer notified the union of its proposed decision but the union failed to request
bargaining in a timely manner, thus waiving its right to bargain through inaction. Id. at 25-26.
107. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., City of Kelso, PECB No. 2633-A, at 19 (1988) (finding that bargaining not
required when employer "goes out of the business" of providing particular service. or function).
109. See City ofKelso, PECB No. 2120-A, at 9 (rejecting need for speed, flzxibility, or secrecy
because "[m]ost public sector institutions do not exist to compete with private enterprise"). PERC
imposes steep penalties on employers who fail to meet their statutory bargaining obligations. The
general practice is to restore those "injured to the situation they would have enjoyed had no unfair
labor practice been committed." City ofKelso, PECB No. 2633, at 30.
110. Local 1052, International Association of Fire Fighters v. PERC, 113 Wash. 2d 197, 203, 778
P.2d 32,35 (1989).
111. Id.
112. 1d. at 207,778 P.2d at 37.
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PERC has employed such an analysis in some cases,"' it has continued
to characterize contracting out as an almost per se mandatory bargaining
subject." 4
III. THE STEPS TO PRIVATIZATION
Currently, local public sector employers desiring to privatize services
face two distinct challenges. First, they must meet the requirements set
forth in the Spokane decision."' Second, if the privatization decision
potentially affects the work of unionized employees, employers also
must bargain that decision." 6
Under Spokane and later decisions, privatizing services traditionally
performed by civil service employees can be accomplished in several
ways. First, the government employer can show it is no longer practical
to continue the current service delivery mode"' or demonstrate that it is
abolishing entirely one aspect of its operation." 8 Alternatively, the
employer's legislative body can change its own civil service system to
clarify that the merit principle governing employee hiring and retention
does not bar contracting out for efficiency or other public policy
reasons."9 A more draconian approach would abolish the employer's
merit system altogether, a politically unpalatable act.
Even if the public employer demonstrates that it is no longer
practicable for its civil service employees to continue to provide the
services in question, it must still face bargaining over that decision to the
extent that it infinges on a union's recognized work jurisdiction. As long
as the employer retains the legal rights and responsibilities of the
provision of those services, the employer likely is required to bargain its
privatization decision. 2°  In the absence of mandated interest
113. See, e.g., City of Anacortes, PECB No. 5668, at 10 (1996); City of Centralia, PECB No.
5282-A, at 7 (1996).
114. See, e.g., Kennewick Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 1, PECB No. 5594, at 26 (1996); King County
Fire Protection Dist. 36, PECB No. 5352, at 8 (1995).
115. See supra part I.A for a discussion of these requirements.
116. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
119. The court in Spokane suggested this alternative itself in its statement that "[iln the absence of
clear legislation expressly authorizing the procurement of personnel to perform the regular functions
of agencies without regard to the personnel laws, we must insist on scrupulous adherence to those
laws and the policies they embody." Washington Federation of State Employees v. Spokane
Community College, 90 Wash. 2d 698, 704, 585 P.2d 474, 478 (1978).
120. See City of Kelso, PECB No. 2633-A, at 18 (1988).
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arbitration, 21 however, this requirement is not as restrictive as it initially
appears.
The employer first must provide the union with notice of its
contracting out proposal and give it an opportunity to bargain the
decision. If the union does not waive its bargaining right, either explicitly
or implicitly through inaction, 22 the employer must negotiate with the
union over the contracting out proposal. Nothing in the collective
bargaining statutes, however, requires an employer or a union to reach
agreement.' Rather, both parties are required to bargain in good faith
and, if an agreement is reached, to set out the agreement in writing.'24 If
no agreement is reached and the employer has exhausted all statutory
dispute procedures,'25 then the employer may implement unilaterally its
proposal. 126
IV. THE SPOKANE DECISION IS FLAWED AND SHOULD NOT
BE APPLIED TO LOCAL PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES
Irrespective of whether a local public sector employer is able to
comply with the strictures of both the Spokane decision and the
collective bargaining process, these requirements, as they currently exist,
are inappropriate. The policy concerns underlying Spokane and its
progeny can be better served by other methods available to modem
governments. Moreover, courts need to address public policy concerns
through a case-by-case analysis rather than imposing an outright ban on
privatization. In addition, courts err by blindly applying an interpretation
121. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 41.56.450 (1996) (requiring binding interest arbitration for
uniformed personnel and their employers when impasse in negotiations is reached). Interest
arbitration statutes empower a neutral third party arbitrator or arbitration panel to impose a legally
enforceable award on unresolved items in negotiations. See City of Bellevue v. Local 1604,
International Association of Fire Fighters, 119 Wash. 2d373, 376, 831 P.2d 738, 739 (1992).
122. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
123. Wash. Rev. Code § 41.56.030(4) (1996). The employer also is required to bargain the impact
that decision has on bargaining unit members if the decision affects the members' wages, hours, or
other employment terms and conditions. See Local 1052, International Associaion of Fire Fighters
v. PERC, 113 Wash. 2d 197,201,778 P.2d 32, 34 (1989).
124. Wash. Rev. Code § 41.56.030(4).
125. Wash. Rev. Code § 41.56.100 (1996).
126. The employer is required to wait one year after reaching impasse before implementing
unilaterally its proposal when there is an existing contract in place between the employer and the
union. Wash. Rev. Code § 41.56.123 (1996). Unilateral implementation is not permissible with units
covered under the State's interest arbitration statute. Rather, the impasse procedures end in interest
arbitration, in which a neutral third party imposes a settlement on the parties. Wash. Rev. Code §
41.56.450 (1996).
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of the state civil service system to local employers. Finally, collective
bargaining contracting out restrictions should be narrowed to allow
public sector employers to address timely and efficiently citizens' needs.
A. Spokane's Reasoning Is Anachronistic
The Washington Supreme Court issued the Spokane decision in 1978,
relying on reasoning from other jurisdictions that has long since been
abandoned.'27 Even if the decision seemed logical when first decided
almost twenty years ago, the decision's logic and reasoning do not
resonate today.
Spokane rested on the assumption that the civil service system was
designed to accomplish two functions: to provide a mechanism for
reducing government inefficiency and waste, and to eradicate the
political patronage system from state governance. 2 ' Heeding these two
considerations, the court wedded the government thereafter to one
method of supplying government services: civil service employees.
Regardless of the goals of the civil service system, government's
primary function at any level is to govern, not to employ. Effective
governing requires efficiency, and efficiency extends beyond
considerations of a qualified governmental workforce 2 9 Governmental
entities have a responsibility as well as a right to consider "mere costs"
when determining the appropriate mode of service delivery. Government
employers, like private employers, need to respond to contemporary
fiscal concerns. Further, requiring a state or political subunit to be tied
127. Washington Fed'n of State Employees v. Spokane Community College, 90 Wash. 2d 698,
703-04, 585 P.2d 474, 477 (1978) (citing Stockburger v. Riley, 68 P.2d 741 (Cal. App. 1937),
overruled by California State Employees' Ass'n v. State, 245 Cal. Rptr. 232 (Ct. App. 1988)); Turel
v. Delaney, 32 N.E.2d 774 (N.Y. 1941). Subsequent cases indicate that the Washington court read
the New York rule too broadly. See, e.g., Corwin v. Farrell, 100 N.E.2d 135, 139 (N.Y. 1951)
(holding that state subdivisions are free to contract out as long as private contractor is controlled by
private entity and there is no evidence of subterfuge employer-employee relationship between
contractor and public entity); Westchester County Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Cimino, 58
A.D.2d 869, 870 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (contracting out for services violates state constitution only
when private contractor's employees are not independent of government), affd, 380 N.E.2d 327
(N.Y. 1978). In addition, California subsequently has moved to a rule in which work that is part of
an existing state function and that involves the types of services traditionally performed by civil
service employees may be contracted out as long as the government agency can prove that the
contract will result in greater efficiency and economy without compromising the integrity of the civil
service. California State Employees'Ass'n, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 234; see also Professional Eng'rs in
Cal. Gov't v. Department of Transp., 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 465,477 (Ct. App. 1996).
128. Spokane, 90 Wash. 2d at 703, 585 P.2d at 477.
129. See Moore v. State, 875 P.2d 765, 769 (Alaska 1994).
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forever to a system of providing services simply because the voters
rejected political patronage is unduly burdensome. Arguably, certain
governmental functions, such as regulatory functions, should remain in
the public sector. Other functions, however, may be appropriately
contracted out to private companies that have the expertise and
specialized equipment needed to perform the task at issue.13 Such
contracting out could accomplish the government's efficiency goals.
Most states have recognized that possessing a civil service system
does not mandate the use of civil service employees to provide
government functions merely because those employees have done so
historically.' Courts in other jurisdictions have recognized that
changing technology as well as changing public needs and desires for
services are legitimate reasons for contracting out traditional civil service
functions.'32 Further, many states have recognized that changing
economic realities justify a decision to contract out.'
Unlike other jurisdictions, Washington has not recognized these
rationales underlying privatization decisions. This difference in approach
derives not from fundamentally diverse statutory schemes, but rather
from basic philosophical disagreements. The Washington Supreme Court
is unwilling to defer to an agency a decision that has wide-ranging
implications without clear legislative direction.'34 Under Washington's
current approach, even a decision so mundane as who gets to deep clean
the locker rooms in a local high school does not escape scrutiny, where
this work is performed by civil service janitors. 35 Even if the monetary
amount of the contract is de minimus, where it involves civil service
employees' work, such a decision falls under the Spokane rubric.
Unquestionably, most privatization decisions present legitimate public
policy concerns. Although the social costs of privatizing a government
work force at any level might justify legislative scrutiny, and situations
requiring judicial intervention on a case-by-case basis may arise, the risk
130. See supra note 39.
131. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text
132. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 119.
135. See Clover Park Sch. Dist, PECB 2560-A (1986). Though this example stems from a PERC
case determining whether the employer's decision to contract out custodial work performed by
unionized employees is a mandatory subject of bargaining, certainly the employees could claim a
violation of the Spokane rule as well, absent a showing that it was impracticable for the employees to
provide such services.
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that privatization poses to the merit system does not warrant the drastic
measure of declaring it almost completely barred by statute.
B. A Civil Service System Is Just One Method of Eliminating Political
Patronage
The primary purpose of most jurisdictions' civil service systems is to
eliminate political spoils. The civil service system, however, is just one
method of accomplishing that goal. Furthermore, as evidenced by the
pervasive political patronage schemes that have survived in a number of
jurisdictions, it is not a necessarily secure one at that."6
Washington State government and its political subdivisions already
have many tools at hand to combat political patronage and thus
government inefficiency that could result from privatization. For
example, most governmental agencies have regulations mandating open
and competitive bidding for government contracts.' Publication of the
request for proposed bids, notices of the opportunity to bid, and bidding
procedures themselves are required.' Furthermore, removing the
decision-making authority of elected officials from all but the final award
of bids also aids in ensuring the fair distribution of contracts. 3 9 Not only
are all these tools currently available to public entities, the U.S. Supreme
Court's recent decisions extending First Amendment protections to
government contractors 4° provide added incentive for these tools to be
employed with greater frequency and vigilance.
Additional steps can be taken to ensure that privatizing services is free
from the taint of the political spoils system. For example, Washington
State courts already have a tool to review an individual agency's
privatization decision to ensure that the motivating factor was not
political considerations or a desire to set up a spoils system. Such a
review is available under the State's Administrative Procedure Act.'4 ' In
addition, the legislative body could provide a mechanism for affected
136. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., King County Code §§ 4.14-.16 (1993); Snohomish County Code § 3.04.160
(1992).
138. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 39.04.190 (1996); King County Code § 4.16.020 (1995).
139. The California Legislature also has included bidding requirements to ensure that the contract
will not undermine the State's affirmative action program. California State Employees' Association
v. State, 245 Cal. Rptr. 232,235 (Ct. App. 1988) (citing Cal. Gov't Code § 19130(a)(4), (a)(8)).
140. See supra note 33.
141. Wash. Rev. Code ch. 34.05 (1996). The APA also provides for review of arbitrary and
capricious agency action. Wash. Rev. Code § 34.05.570(4)(c)(iii).
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employees to appeal an agency's decision to the existing civil service
commission or reviewing board, or provide another form of internal
review. This review could ensure that individual employees are not the
target of politically-motivated decision-making. 42 Most entities' civil
service systems already provide employees rights to apl eal layoffs and
other personnel actions taken in violation of the existing rules. 43 Thus,
extending appeal rights to civil service employees for impermissible
contracting out is not unduly burdensome.
C. The Legislature Should Amend the Civil Service Laws To Permit
Privatization
The Washington Legislature should amend the state's civil service
laws to limit the reach of Spokane and subsequent decisions.
Specifically, the Legislature should devise standards outlining when
privatization is permissible. The reform legislation introduced in the
1993 and 1995 sessions contained a provision allowing state agencies to
contract for services in the private sector.'" This legislation contained no
relief, however, for the judicially-imposed constraints extended in Joint
Crafts to local public sector entities.'45 As discussed above, local public
sector employers must seek legislative change of their own civil service
systems to limit the reach of Joint Crafts. 46
The Washington rule as currently formulated has forced lower courts
to find meaningless distinctions to allow employers to provide public
services in a more efficient, effective manner. The Keeton court, for
example, distinguished Spokane by noting that in Spokane, the employer
contracted for services, janitorial services, but in Keeton, the employer
bought a finished product, baked goods."' The court in Joint Crafts
focused on the impracticability of civil service employees continuing to
142. Louisiana, for example, requires that the Director of Civil Service review and approve or
disapprove any contract for services to ensure that the contracts do not provide for the performance
of services that could and should be provided by civil service employees. Parker v. State Dep't of
Civil Serv., 454 So. 2d 162, 165 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (citing Civil Service Rule 3.1(o)).
143. See, e.g., King County Code §§ 3.12.280-.290 (1994); Snohomish County Code § 3A.11
(1989).
144. Personnel System Reform Act of 1995, S. 5841, §§ 208, 403, 54th Legis. Sess. (Wash. 1995)
(Second Substitute Senate Bill). Section 208 of the Bill exempted contracting out decisions from
collective bargaining requirements.
145. See S. 5841.
146. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
147. Keeton v. Department of Soc. Servs., 34 Wash. App. 353, 360, 661 P.2d 982, 986 (1983).
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provide services, specifically centralized vehicle maintenance, when the
delivery method needed to change.148
Rather than forcing agencies and courts to cloak decisions in the
verbiage of Spokane, the Legislature should acknowledge that, for some
agencies both at the state and local level, the civil service system may be
too expensive to maintain in its current form. Either the Legislature
should mandate a change in the system to cut costs or it should allow the
agency to privatize services.
By allowing privatization without addressing the civil service
system's inefficiencies or costs, the Legislature disserves its citizens.
Citizens ultimately pay for antiquated and costly systems and are
deprived of the opportunity to have a public hearing and to provide input
on much needed changes. Thus, the Legislature should assure that when
the costs of the system itself spur the privatization need, a review is
triggered to evaluate whether or not the agency can reduce its cost of
directly providing the services. Requiring the public entity to compete
for contracts as opposed to eliminating public sector servicing altogether
can also spur cost reductions. For example, an Arizona scheme that
allows the public sector to compete with the private sector on contract
bids has resulted in increased efficiency and productivity.'49
In some instances, however, an employer is attempting to make a
fundamental operational change, not necessarily motivated by fiscal
concerns resulting solely or primarily from labor costs. The civil service
system ought not impede that change. Certainly the public may demand
decentralized services to respond to the needs of growing municipalities
and counties, as in the car-per-officer system allowed in Joint Crafts.
Further, public employees may not possess the skills to provide
necessary services, or the costs of acquiring the technological means or
increasing employee expertise may be prohibitive. 5 In short, a public
employer, as a governing entity, should be able to respond to its citizen's
service needs, efficiently and effectively, whether or not that response
148. Joint Crafts Council v. King County, 76 Wash. App. 18, 21-22, 881 P.2d 1059, 1061-62
(1994).
149. See Kettl et al., supra note 18, at 67-68. Even making privatization a subject for serious
discussion can spur reforms. For example, after Ohio's Governor Voinovich advocated more
privatization of government services, the state employees' association formed a partnership with
management to increase worker productivity. One program alone saved $13 million by consolidating
73 training programs into 13. Neal R. Peirce, Songs Don't Tell Labor's True Story Today, Hous.
Chron., Sept. 2, 1996, at A40.
150. See supra note 39.
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comes from within the civil service system. Legislation is needed to
clarify that the civil service system is not an impediment to privatization.
D. Blind Application of the State Civil Service System to Local Public
Sector Employers Is Inappropriate
In Spokane, the Washington Supreme Court reviewed the state's civil
service laws and its implications for higher education employees' rights
to continued employment.' The state's civil service statutes under
consideration not only provided for merit in the hiring and firing of
employees in general, but the then current regulations implementing
these statutes severely restricted the reasons why a higher education
employee could be laid off.'52
According to those regulations, state higher education institutions
could lay off employees only due to lack of funds or curtailment of
work.'53 In contrast, the local public sector employer in the Joint Crafts
case, King County, operates under its own charter and county
ordinances.'54 These ordinances provide an expansive right to lay off
workers for lack of work or funds, and most significantly, for
considerations of efficiency.'55 This right demands that the state bar on
contracting out not be extended to its political subunits that operate
within different limitations."5 6
The Washington Legislature has placed many restrictions on local
public sector employers in the state; it is unwilling to place such
restrictions on itself.'57 Often these restraints, such as the imposition of
full-scope collective bargaining and interest arbitration, are created in the
151. Washington Federation of State Employees v. Spokane Community College, 90 Wash. 2d
698, 700-701, 585 P.2d 474, 476-477 (1978) (interpreting state's Higher Education Personnel Law
(Wash. Rev. Code ch. 28B.16)).
152. Washington Administrative Code section 251-10-030(1) provided that employers may lay
off employees only for lack of funds or curtailment of work. Wash. Admin. Code § 251-10-030
(1995). This regulation has since been amended to include the "good faith reorganization for
efficiency purposes." Wash. St. Reg. 96-13-077.
153. Wash. Admin. Code § 251-10-030(1).
154. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
155. King County Code § 3.12.300 (1993).
156. Otherjurisdictions have recognized that state restrictions do not extend to the state's political
subdivisions having different rules and regulations. See, e.g., Allen v. City of Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d
367,370-71 (9th Cir. 1990).
157. See supra note 102.
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name of the public good.5 By judicially extending the Spokane
constraint, the state courts have eroded further the ability of local public
sector employers, in their role as governmental entities, to address
citizens' needs effectively and efficiently.
E. Collective Bargaining Restrictions on Local Public Sector
Employers Should Be Narrowed
The Public Employment Relations Commission applies a broad
reading of private sector precedent to require bargaining over almost all
privatization decisions. Although some concepts derived from private
sector experience may transfer well to the public sector, wholesale
adoption of such concepts is inappropriate.
Although contracting out decisions in the private sector are likely to
be based on monetary considerations, 59 governmental agencies are
entrusted not only with ensuring the public's tax dollars are spent
efficiently, but also with fulfilling the public's service needs in the most
effective way possible. Thus the core differences between public and
private employers and the reasons underlying their contracting out
decisions stem from fundamentally different concerns. Further, in the
private sector, union demands may be influenced by private employers'
ability to relocate their business if operating costs in one locale become
too burdensome and if competitive pressures become too great. 6 Neither
of these factors exists to influence bargaining in the public sector. This
absence, coupled with labor's ability to influence the political agenda,' 6'
demands that some decisions striking at public sector managerial
control's core be left outside the collective bargaining arena.
Furthermore, PERC's requirements extend beyond even what the
NLRB and the Washington Supreme Court have required. Unlike PERC,
the NLRB, guided by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Fibreboard6 z and its progeny, has recognized that for some management
decisions requiring entrepreneurial discretion, bargaining should be
required only if the benefit for labor-management relations and the
158. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 41.56.430 (1996) (guaranteeing uninterrupted and dedicated
service of uniformed personnel because of vital nature to welfare and public safety of state); Wash.
Rev. Code § 41.56.010 (1996) (promoting continued improvement of relationship between public
employers and employees).
159. See Weisberger, supra note 49, at 697.
160. Id.
161. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
162. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
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collective bargaining process outweighs the burden placed on the
conduct of the business. 63 The Washington Supreme Court has adopted
this approach, rebuking PERC for making blanket scope-of-bargaining
decisions."6
Rather than impose a per se rule mandating bargaining over most
privatization decisions, PERC instead should examine each public sector
employer's unique needs. Where bargaining prevents the government
entity from meeting citizens' needs, bargaining should not be mandatory.
A case-specific analysis would allow public sector employers to privatize
without the undue delays that can result from mandatory bargaining
requirements. This analysis, additionally, would prevent employers from
privatizing solely to rid themselves of unionized employees. Just as in
the private sector, privatization decisions motivated solely by anti-union
animus violates and will continue to violate employees' collective
bargaining rights.
Although the present PERC rule mandating bargaining over
privatization decisions may provide employees the greatest degree of
protection, the cost to the public of such protection can be great. For
example, implementing the car-per-officer program of Joint Crafts
certainly would have been delayed or even canceled completely if
bargaining over the use of private entities to provide vehicle maintenance
had been required.'65 The delay in implementing a new, decentralized
system, and the continued use of unresponsive, outmoded delivery
methods contribute to public sentiment that government is inefficient.
V. CONCLUSION: A MODEL FOR CHANGE
Unquestionably, privatization poses problems for public concern. Any
resulting societal harm, however, generally will be unique to each
situation and can be addressed on a case-by-case basis. The almost-
blanket, judicially-imposed bar against privatization should be removed.
At the same time, government employers must ensure that adequate
safeguards exist to protect both employees from arbitrary personnel
actions and the public from the political spoils system's ills. Appropriate
safeguards include systems mandating employee layoff by seniority, and
competitive, open bidding processes for awards of contracts.
163. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 110-114 and accompanying text.
165. Joint Crafts Council v. King County, 76 Wash. App. 18, 881 P.2d 1059 (1994).
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The collective bargaining rules should be changed to require agencies
to meet and confer over contracting out decisions and to ensure that
unions have adequate opportunity to suggest alternatives to contracting
out. Full-scale negotiations, however, should not be required. The change
in the type of bargaining right granted would ensure timely
implementation of public employers' decisions to manage the public
trust most effectively. Finally, PERC should be able to review union
appeals on a case-by-case basis to ensure that the employer's is not
motivated solely by anti-union animus, and therefore has not violated the
employees' collective bargaining rights.

